







The article examines the judicial attitude and the development of the policy of 
English law favouring arbitration. It suggests that, contrary to the prevailing 
narrative in legal literature, English judicial attitudes in the 18th and 19th 
centuries never reflected a hostility to arbitration. As is demonstrated, a policy 
favouring arbitration was introduced by the legislature as early as the end of the 
17th century, and was subsequently developed by English courts deciding under 
statutory law and in the 19th century under the common law. The analysis offers, 
for the first time, an account of English arbitration as a dispute resolution system 
which originally emerged as being part of, rather than antagonistic to, the 
English courts system. Understanding how arbitration developed in England is 
important not only for historical purposes but also because it can provide helpful 
insights into current debates surrounding the legitimacy and potential reform of 
English arbitration law.   
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Today, it is generally accepted that English law and courts favour arbitration as a 
matter of policy.1 However, the prevailing narrative in legal literature suggests that 
the pro-arbitration policy of English law only developed as recently as the second part 
of the 20th century.2 Relying on a limited number of cases, mainly the rulings in 
Vynior’s (1609), Wellington v McIntosh (1743) and Kill v Hollister (1746), and Lord 
Campbell’s observation in Scott v Avery (1856) that English judges traditionally ‘had 
great jealousy of arbitrations’,3 a number of commentators have argued that English 
courts in the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries were generally hostile to arbitration.4 
It is claimed that the fact that arbitration was flourishing by the 15th 
century was mainly symptomatic of unfit common law institutions and a dysfunctional 
machinery of state justice at the time.5 It is argued, therefore, that the rise of the 
                                                        
1 See e.g. Cruz City 1 Mauritius Holdings v Unitech Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 1512 at [36(v)] (Gloster 
LJ, as she then was).	
2 See for example, Gary Born, International Commercial Arbitration (2nd edn, Kluwer 2014) 36–
38; Julius Henry Cohen, Commercial Arbitration and the Law (D. Appleton 1918); K. Zweigert 
and H. Kotz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (3rd edn, Clarendon Press 1998); W.S. 
Holdsworth, A History of English Law (Volume 14) (Sweet & Maxwell 1937); Bruce L. Benson, 
‘An Exploration of the Impact of Modern Arbitration Statutes on the Development of Arbitration 
in the United States’ (1995) 11(2) Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 479–501.  
3 Scott v Avery (1856) 5 H.L. Cas. 811, 10 ER 1121.  
4 See for example, Ernest Lorenzen, ‘Commercial Arbitration– International and Interstate 
Aspects’ (1934) 43 Yale L.J. 721; Albert Van den Berg, The New York Convention of 1958 (Kluwer 
1981) 6; Julian Lew, ‘Achieving the Dream: Autonomous Arbitration’ (2006) 22(2) Arbitration 
International 183; Kyriaki Noussia, Confidentiality in International Commercial Arbitration – A 
Comparative Analysis of the Position under English, US, German and French Law (Springer 2010) 
12.  
5 J.G. Bellamy, Crime and Public Order in England in the Later Middle Ages (London 1972) 114; R.L. 
Storey, The End of the House of Lancaster (Barrie and Rockliff 1966); and I. Rowney, ‘Arbitration 
in Gentry Disputes of the Later Middle Ages’ (1982) 67 History 367–76. 
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common law during the 17th and the 18th centuries entailed that common law courts 
felt empowered to curtail arbitrators’ jurisdiction which was largely seen as a threat to 
their authority and a substitution of court litigation.  
This article challenges the prevailing narrative on two grounds. First, it 
fails to distinguish between statutory arbitration and arbitration under the common 
law. As the article demonstrates, the policy of the law and attitudes of the courts were 
quite different under these two legal frameworks. Under statutory law, a policy 
favouring arbitration was introduced as early as the end of the 17th century and was 
further developed by a series of arbitration statutes in the 19th and 20th centuries. 
When deciding under statutory law, English courts were historically keen to enforce 
arbitration agreements and implement the policy favouring arbitration. By contrast, 
the common law did not develop a distinct policy favouring the enforcement of 
arbitration agreements until the second part of the 19th century. 
Secondly, even under the common law, the suggestion that English courts 
were generally hostile to arbitration is exaggerated, if not inaccurate. Rather, the 
article suggests, the historical attitude of English courts towards arbitration can be 
more accurately described as one of cautious trust, informed by, on the one hand, 
common law’s well-embedded respect for party autonomy and English courts’ typical 
pragmatism, and, on the other hand, the idea that arbitration agreements cannot oust 
the jurisdiction of English courts and the entailing rule of revocability whereby 
arbitration agreements were revocable at will.   
However, notwithstanding the fact that the rule of revocability remained 
good law throughout the 19th century, the attitude of English courts in the 18th and 
19th centuries never reflected a broader ideological opposition to arbitration, as was 
the case in certain periods of time in other jurisdictions, for example in France, the US 
Page 3 of 41 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies
 4
and Germany. Rather, the article demonstrates, the principle of revocability mainly 
reflected a narrow doctrinal objection, namely that for English courts of the time 
arbitration agreements were akin to agency agreements which are in general 
inherently revocable, upon notice.  Once the House of Lords ruling in Scott v Avery6 
offered a doctrinal way out, English courts had no difficulty to adopt a policy favouring 
the enforcement of arbitration agreements. 
Overall, the analysis in this article offers for the first time an account of 
English arbitration as a dispute resolution system which organically emerged as part 
of, rather than antagonistic to, the English judicial system. As a result, arbitration in 
England was not historically perceived as a suspicious form of private justice which 
could potentially threaten the interests of the public, and challenge the authority of the 
courts and the common law.  
As the article explains, understanding how arbitration developed in 
England and providing an accurate account of the development of the policy of the law 
favouring arbitration is important not only for historical purposes but also because it 
can provide helpful insights into current debates surrounding the legitimacy of 
arbitration, and the potential reform of English arbitration law under the Law 
Commission’s 13th law reform programme. Because the pro-arbitration policy has 
been generally, albeit erroneously, understood to be a relatively recent development, 
arbitration has often been linked with the rise of capitalism and the re-emergence of 
transnational merchant law theories in the second part of the 20th century. In this 
context, arbitration has been criticised as being part of the project of neoliberalism to 
serve the interests of powerful corporations. While some of the accusations give rise 
to valid concerns for certain types of arbitrations, especially investment arbitration, 
                                                        
6 Scott v Avery (n 3). 
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they are largely premised on wrong historical assumptions for commercial arbitration, 
at least in England. As the Law Commission in the UK is currently considering whether 
arbitration law may require reform, it is important for the legal community to embark 
on a balanced debate about English arbitration law, which is not based on inaccurate 
or partisan assumptions for the historical role of arbitration.  
It should be noted from the outset that while the article relies on 
historical sources, mainly secondary, the main aim of the article is not to contribute to 
legal history debates; rather, it is to challenge pervasive misconceptions in arbitration 
scholarship about the historical evolution of arbitration in England and offer historical 
perspectives to advance the discussion about the current role of arbitration. 
The article proceeds in six sections, including this introduction. To 
understand how the statutory policy favouring arbitration emerged and developed 
over the centuries in England, it is necessary to provide an overview of the historical 
context of arbitration practice within which the first arbitration statute was 
introduced at the end of the 17th century. Following this introduction, section two 
addresses this point and shows that most mercantile disputes in early modern 
England were decided by arbitration tribunals because arbitration offered a range of 
distinct advantages over litigation, especially for traders and merchants. 
Section three reviews the arbitration statutes in the last three centuries 
and shows that the Parliament enacted a series of arbitration-related legislation with 
the aim of introducing a policy favouring arbitration as a means of promoting 
business. As a result, English courts, when deciding under statutory law, were on the 
whole keen to give effect to arbitration agreements. 
Section four examines the attitude of English common law courts towards 
arbitration from early modern England until the 20th century, examining the 
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development of the principle of revocability. The analysis suggests that English 
common law did not develop a policy favouring arbitration until as late as the second 
part of the 19th century, and certainly much later than statutory arbitration. The 
analysis further suggests that while the principle of revocability remained part of the 
common law until the 19th century, the judicial attitude to arbitration was never 
fundamentally hostile. The fifth section provides a general assessment of the judicial 
and legislative treatment of arbitration in England and offers contrasting experiences 
from other jurisdictions, notably France, the US and Germany. Section six concludes 
the analysis by explaining the current importance of understanding how arbitration 
developed historically in England, and how challenging inaccurate assumptions 
concerning the policy favouring arbitration can add to the current debate for reform of 






Arbitration was already an established legal institution in early modern England 
making an important contribution to the social and economic development of the 
country. Mercantile disputes in particular were decided in their majority by 
arbitration tribunals, with commercial parties routinely agreeing, orally or in writing, 
to submit an existing dispute to arbitration under the common law prior to the filing of 
any action in court.7 
                                                        
7 See Carli N. Conklin, ‘A Variety of State-Level Procedures, Practices, and Policies: Arbitration in 
Early America Symposium’ (2016) Journal of Dispute Resolution 61 making the point in relation 
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The extensive use of arbitration in this era is demonstrated by a variety of 
historical records. First, standard forms of arbitration agreements and awards started 
to appear in the 17th century in certain lines of trade, notably in the field of 
construction and insurance.8 Horwitz and Oldham state that almost all of the 90 
surviving building agreements between 1720 and 1730 for the Grosvenor Estate in 
Mayfair required that any dispute between builders be submitted to three arbitrators, 
who were typically architects, surveyors and craftsmen.9 
Further, there are numerous historical accounts of individuals working as 
busy arbitrators and mediators, commissioned both by the Government and by private 
parties, throughout the 16th and 17th centuries. For example, Roebuck states that 
Nathaniel Bacon, the older half-brother of the more famous Francis and a very popular 
arbitrator, was acting as arbitrator in two or three matters every month, on average.10 
Finally, there is interesting contemporaneous legal literature on 
arbitration. Indeed, arbitration in the 17th century was considered important enough 
to attract the attention of extensive treatises such as John March’s Actions for Slander 
and Arbitrement published in 1648, and an anonymous treatise, entitled Arbitrium 
                                                                                                                                                              
to English arbitration. Also Margo Todd, ‘For Eschewing of Trouble and Exorbitant Expense: 
Arbitration in the Early Modern British Isles Symposium’ (2016) Journal of Dispute Resolution 7. 
8 See for example, M. Clare, Youth’s Introduction to Trade and Business (1751) 132–134, referring 
to forms of ‘A Condition to attend the Award of Arbitrators’ and ‘The Form of Umpirage of 
Award’; cited in William Jones, ‘An Inquiry into the History of the Adjudication of Mercantile 
Disputes in Great Britain and the United States’ (1958) 25(3) University of Chicago Law Review 447. 
9 Henry Horwitz and James Oldham, ‘John Locke, Lord Mansfield, and Arbitration during the 
Eighteenth Century’ (1993) 36(1) The Historical Journal 145–146. Similarly, insurance policies, 
such as the Sun Fire proposals of 1727, provided that any dispute over loss or damage between 
insurer and insured would ‘be submitted to the Judgment and Determination of Arbitrators 
indifferently chosen, whose Award [...] shall be conclusive and binding to all parties’. The 
prevalence of arbitration clauses in insurance policies was noted by Lord Campbell in Scott v 
Avery (n 3) at 853. Indeed, Scott v Avery was a case involving such an arbitration clause, and it 
was upheld by the court. 
10 See for more detail Derek Roebuck, Arbitration and Mediation in Seventeenth-Century England 
(HOLO 2017) drawing on a large collection of Bacon’s published manuscripts, The Papers of 
Nathaniel Bacon of Stiffkey. 
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Revivum: Or the Law of Arbitration published in 1694.11 In his treatise, March, a 
barrister in Grays Inn, noted that ‘Arbitrements were never more in use than now’, 
reassuringly adding that ‘as long as Differences and Contentions arise among men, 
which will be to the World’s End, certainly the learning of Arbitrements will deserve 
our Knowledge.’12 Many other legal commentators of the time refer to arbitration as a 
distinct legal institution, including Blackstone who, in his Commentaries on the Laws of 
England (1765–1769), includes an extensive description of arbitration practices.13 
There are several reasons that explain the preference of arbitration to 
common law courts. First, arbitration was favoured by merchants for being cheaper 
and quicker than litigation. The anonymous author of the 1694 treatise noted that 
‘Arbitrament is much esteemed and greatly favoured in our Common Law […] to 
prevent the great Trouble and frequent Expense of Law-suits’.14 Importantly, parties 
usually dealt with the arbitration without legal counsel, who was required only for 
complex disputes referred to arbitration by equity courts.15 Notably, arbitrators, at 
least before the 17th century, were not paid for their services, which were considered 
akin to public service. Indeed, the role of arbitrator was considered an honourable 
distinction for prominent men known for their sense of fairness and justice16 (and 
                                                        
11 James Oldham, ‘The Historically Shifting Sands of Reasons to Arbitrate Symposium’ (2016) 
Journal of Dispute Resolution 41, 42. 
12 See Oldham (n 11) 41. 
13 Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England (Clarendon Press 1765) Vol. III, Chap. IV, 16–
17: ‘Arbitration is where the parties, injuring and injured, submit all matters in dispute, 
concerning any personal chattels or personal wrongs, to the judgment of two or more 
arbitrators; who are to decide the controversy: and if they do not agree, it is usual to add, that 
another person be called in as umpire, (imperator) to whose sole judgment it is then referred: 
or frequently there is only one arbitrator originally appointed. This decision, in any of these 
cases, is called an award. And thereby the question is as fully determined, and the right 
transferred or settled, as it could have been by the agreement of the parties of the judgment of 
the court of justice.’. Cited in Conklin (n 7) 61. 
14 See Preface, ‘To the Reader’ in Arbitrium Redivivum: Or the Law of Arbitration (1694), cited in 
Oldham (n 11) 42.  
15 Todd (n 7) 10. 
16 Craig Muldrew, ‘The Culture of Reconciliation: Community and the Settlement of Economic 
Disputes in Early Modern England’ (1996) 39 The Historical Journal 915, 932. 
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they were invariably men, as few historical examples of women acting as arbitrators 
exist).17 Popular arbitrators only decided to make arbitration part of their business 
when the number of arbitration references significantly increased at the end of the 
18th century,18 and even then, they were charging modestly.19  
As regards speed, in an observation that would probably embarrass many 
arbitrators today, arbitrators generally delivered their decisions on the same day the 
disputes were brought to them, with the longest hearings lasting no more than a few 
weeks.20  
Secondly, arbitration had a broader jurisdictional scope than courts and 
was therefore more suitable for cross-regional and international disputes. Because of 
their consensual nature, arbitration tribunals could assume jurisdiction over disputes 
between merchants from different regions, including foreign merchants who were not 
subject to the jurisdiction of common law courts. As Blackstone noted:  
The reason of their original institution seems to have been, to do justice 
expeditiously among the variety of persons that resort from distant places 
to a fair or market; since it is probable that no inferior court might be able 
to serve its process, or execute its judgments, on both or perhaps either of 
the parties.21 
                                                        
17Francis Calvert Boorman, ‘Arbitration and Elite Honour in Elizabethan England: A Case Study of 
Bess of Hardwick Symposium’ (2016) Journal of Dispute Resolution 19, 20. 
18 Oldham (n 11) 43, referring to J. Palmer, Supplement to the Attorney and Agents Table of Costs 
(1833) 73.   
19 Oldham (n 11). 
20 Todd (n 7) 10. With reference to the court of piepoudre, Blackstone Commentaries (n 13) noted 
that ‘the injury must be done, complained of, heard and determined, within the compass of one 
and the same day, unless the fair continues longer, Blackstone, Commentaries (n 13), 33. 
21 Blackstone, Commentaries (n 13). 
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Further, and more decisively, arbitration was trusted more than English 
courts because it operated as a community-based dispute settlement process.22 
Unresolved quarrels were perceived as a threat to the social structure of a community 
and could potentially lead men to abandon reason and resort to violence. Thus, there 
was a strong sense of duty within the community, underpinned by ethical Christian 
values, to assist their members to settle their disputes outside courts, preferably 
amicably.23 Individuals who were frequently requested to act as arbitrators were 
prominent members of the local community, often including friends, neighbours and 
kinsmen, who had the advantage of knowing the disputing parties and often the 
history of the dispute.24  
The concept of arbitration as a means to promote peace explains why 
arbitrators, from the early modern era onwards, were inclined not to declare a clear 
winner and leave a demoralised loser, but to arrive at a compromise which would be 
acceptable to all stakeholders in the dispute.25 Honour was traditionally of great 
importance to dispute resolution in England.26 A compromise would permit the losing 
party to save face and engage again with the winning party in a commercial 
relationship.27  While today arbitrators are often criticised when they reach a 
compromise decision on the basis that ‘splitting the baby’ is essentially an attempt to 
appease both disputing parties who are paying their fees,28 arriving at a decision that 
                                                        
22 Todd (n 7) 8. 
23 Muldrew (n 16) 929. 
24 Todd (n 7) 8. 
25 Todd (n 7) 9. 
26 Francis Calvert Boorman, ‘Arbitration and Elite Honour in Elizabethan England: A Case Study of 
Bess of Hardwick Symposium’ (2016) Journal of Dispute Resolution 20, citing Linda A. Pollock, 
‘Honor, gender, and reconciliation in elite culture, 1570–1700’ (2007) 46 J. Br. Stud. 3, 19.  
27 Derek Roebuck, ‘The Myth of Judicial Jealousy’ (1994) 10 Arbitration International 398. 
28 E.g. Alan Scott Rau, ‘Integrity in Private Judging’ (1997) 38 S. Tex. L. Rev. 488.  
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could bring about broad consensus was then generally considered a distinct advantage 
of arbitration and a manifestation of justice.29 
Even further, merchants were not keen to have their disputes resolved by 
courts under common law, because the legal principles of the common law were 
generally alien to them and their practices. The identification of legal rules through 
doctrinal analysis and case law required skills possessed by lawyers, not merchants. 
By contrast, in the merchant courts and subsequently in arbitration, commercial 
disputes were resolved in accordance with the ‘laws’ and practices of the market 
which were readily familiar to merchants. 
Importantly, not only were arbitrators applying the laws and practices of 
the market, but they were also willing to consider the broader context of disputes. 
Unlike courts which tended to focus on a single legal point of conflict, which might 
merely be symptomatic of a deeper conflict between the disputing merchants, 
arbitration allowed parties to ventilate all their grievances.30 This broader approach to 
dispute resolution offered better prospects for arbitration to achieve an overall and 
lasting settlement of the dispute compared with court judgments.31  
The observation that arbitration could traditionally achieve more than 
the law is further underscored by the fact that arbitrators often awarded remedies, 
including specific performance, that common law judges were unable to award.32 In 
that sense, arbitration awards resembled decrees in equity. There are historical 
                                                        
29  As Matthew Bacon stated in his 18th century encyclopaedia entitled A New Abridgment of the 
Law, first published in 1736, to be valid, an award had to be ‘mutually satisfactory’ which, 
according to him, meant the following: ‘That which is awarded to be done to one must be an 
advantage to both, so as to end the controversy, and discharge one as well as give satisfaction to 
the other, for if it does not, it is manifestly unjust’, Tit. Arbitrament and Award, sub-tit (E) “The 
Award Itself…”, No. 3. 
30 see also Edward Powell, ‘Settlement of Disputes by Arbitration in Fifteenth-Century England’ 
(1984) Law and History Review 21, 55. 
31 Ibid, 56. 
32 Bruce Mann, ‘The Formalisation of Informal Law: Arbitration before the American Revolution’, 
(1984) 59 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 443, 465. 
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examples in the 17th century, where in a land dispute arbitrators ordered the return of 
the land to one party, fixed the rent for the use of the land and ordered the 
cancellation of all accounts between the parties.33  
It becomes apparent from the preceding analysis that arbitration was 
widely practised in early modern England, and preferred by merchants for a range of 
commercial reasons.34 This observation explains why the legislators by the end of the 
17th century were keen to enact legislation to turn commercial practice into statutory 





Until late in the 17th century there were two main types of arbitration. First, parties 
would agree orally or in writing to submit an existing dispute to arbitration under the 
common law prior to the filing of any action in court.35 This type of arbitration was 
called ‘submission’ under the common law. 
Secondly, there were disputes that were referred to arbitration by English 
courts or other judicial authorities. Often when a party was bringing a mercantile 
dispute to common law courts and the Chancery by commencing a lawsuit, English 
courts would issue a rule referring the dispute to arbitration, on the basis that 
                                                        
33 Mann (n 32). 
34 The preference of merchants for arbitration was nicely reflected by Daniel Defoe who in his 
1727 treatise entitled The Complete English Tradesman stated that ‘the honest peaceble 
tradesman will, as far as in him lies, prevent a decision at law’ and prefer to submit disputes to ‘a 
friendly accommodation by expostulation, by application, by arbitration’: Daniel Defoe, The 
Complete English Tradesman, Vol. 2 (1727) 119, discussed in Todd (n 7) 18. 
35 See Conklin (n 7) 61. 
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arbitrators were better equipped to decide complex commercial disputes. 36  This type 
of arbitration was called ‘reference’. 
Despite the popularity of submissions, parties in this type of arbitration 
were often faced with two important challenges, namely to secure enforcement of the 
arbitration agreement (non-revocability) and compliance with the outcome of the final 
award (implementation).37 To address these two problems, parties in arbitrations 
under the common law in early modern England typically entered into an arbitration 
bond which allowed a party to bring a lawsuit in the courts to secure compliance with 
an arbitration agreement in the event of revocation and to implement the outcome of 
the arbitration award in the event of non-compliance. These remedies, however, 
entailed that the aggrieved party had to sustain all the expenses and delays associated 
with litigation.38 
By contrast, in references, the compliance of the parties with both the 
order of the courts to refer the dispute to arbitrators and the arbitrators’ decision was 
secured through the courts’ power to punish for contempt. Arbitrators would return 
their decision to the court, which had originally referred the dispute to them, as a 
Report which was filed as a court judgment. If a party failed to abide by it, it was held 
to be in contempt of the court.39 Broad compliance with arbitration agreements and 
enforcement of arbitration awards as court judgments was a great advantage of 
references over submissions under the common law, and accordingly many parties 
would commence court proceedings with the aim of requesting the courts to refer the 
matter to arbitrators.  
                                                        
36 Derek Roebuck, ‘The English Inheritance—What the First American Colonists Knew of 
Mediation and Arbitration’ (2016) Journal of Dispute Resolution 325, 329. 
37 Horwitz and Oldham (n 9) 141. 
38 Horwitz and Oldham (n 9) 141.  
39 See Conklin (n 7) 61. 
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However, it soon became apparent that disputing parties in references 
were wasting considerable time and expense in initially submitting their dispute to the 
courts so that it would subsequently be referred to arbitration.40 Decisively, the 
parties could never be certain whether their dispute would indeed be referred to 
arbitration, as such a decision remained at the discretion of the courts.  
Meanwhile, the enforcement of arbitration agreements and awards 
through bonds in submissions under the common law, which was already haphazard 
throughout the 16th and 17th centuries, was about to suffer a significant setback when 
the common law’s treatment of penalty bonds changed at the end of the 17th century. 
Specifically, in 1697 the Parliament enacted the Administration of Justice Act which 
prohibited the recovery of penalties for any action on a bond issued for the purposes 
of guaranteeing the performance of an agreement.41 Thus, if a party refused to abide 
by an arbitration agreement or award, the holder of an arbitration bond could only 
recover actual damages for non-performance, not penalties. Compared with penalties, 
damages for failure to abide by an arbitration agreement or award were difficult to 
prove and, by nature, very limited in amount.42 This development had the potential of 
undermining the effectiveness of arbitration agreements and awards as well as the 
willingness of commercial parties to submit to arbitration under the common law.43 
In response, the Parliament enacted the 1698 Arbitration Act, one of the 
first arbitration statutes in the world.44 The 1698 Arbitration Act marked a significant 
moment of evolution for arbitration in England, because it introduced for the first time 
                                                        
40 Conklin (n 7) 63. 
41 Administration of Justice Act 1697, 8 & 9 Will. III c. 11, in 8 British History Online 
http://www.britishhistory.ac.uk/lords-jrnl/vol16/pp114-116 [accessed 10 July 2018]).  
42 Penalties for arbitration bonds issued in the 17th century typically amounted to £100, which 
was a significant sum of money at the time. 
43 Conklin (n 7) 63. 
44 Conklin (n 7) 63; Born (n 2) 35. 
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a statutory framework for arbitration. The Act is often referred to as the Locke Act, 
because it was singlehandedly drafted by John Locke,45 after the other four members 
of the Board commissioned him to ‘draw up a scheme of some method of determining 
differences between merchants by referees, that might be decisive without appeal’.46   
Locke, who was familiar with arbitration,47 understood that merchants 
would be willing to use arbitration only if an effective legal mechanism was 
introduced to ensure that arbitration agreements and awards were complied with and 
enforced.48 His draft was adopted by the Board, which submitted it to the Privy 
Council in January 1697, noting that statutory law was necessary to address the ‘great 
obstruction in trade arising from the tedious determination of controversies between 
merchants and traders concerning matters of accompt or trade in our ordinary 
methods’. The Board urged the Council to adopt the draft on the grounds of the ‘very 
great advantage to the Trade of this Kingdom’.49 The bill was finally enacted with 
minor amendments in May 1698.50 
The Locke Act expressly introduced a policy favouring arbitration by 
stating that a legal mechanism for the protection of arbitration agreements was 
necessary ‘for promoting Trade and rendering the Awards of Arbitrators the more 
effectual in all Cases’.51Under the Locke Act, private parties who wished to refer their 
dispute to arbitration could register their agreement as a rule of court, but without 
                                                        
45 Oldham (n 11) 42. 
46 Public Record Office, Colonial Office 391/9, p. 62, cited in Horwitz and Oldham (n 9) 138. 
47 Possibly because he was fully aware of disputes arising from the plantations in America of the 
time: see Barbara Arneil, ‘Trade, Plantations and Property: John Locke and the Economic Defense 
of Colonialism’ (1994) 55(4) Journal of the History of Ideas (October) 591–609. 
48 Horwitz and Oldham (n 9) 139. 
49 Cited in Horwitz and Oldham (n 9) 143. 
50 Horwitz and Oldham (n 9) 144. 
51 'William III, 1697-8: An Act for determining Differences by Arbitration. Chapter XV, Rot.Parl. 9 
Gul. III.p.3., in Statutes of the Realm: Volume 7, 1695-1701, ed. John Raithby (s.l, 1820), pp. 369-
370. British History Online http://www.british-history.ac.uk/statutes-realm/vol7/pp369-370 
[accessed 10 July 2018]. 
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commencing court litigation. Once an arbitration agreement was registered with the 
court, it became ‘subject to all the penalties of contemning a Rule of Court [as if] a 
suitor or defendant in such Court’.52 Registration further entailed that the arbitrators’ 
decision was returned to and issued by the courts, and was therefore enforced as a 
court judgment.53 Thus, arbitration under the Locke Act offered the distinct benefits of 
both submissions and references, namely the ability to resort to arbitration without 
wasting time and expense in commencing litigation in the first place and the ability to 
enforce arbitration agreements and arbitral awards through the courts’ contempt 
power.54 As Horwitz and Oldham observe, the Locke Act ‘did work’, with most parties 
voluntarily abiding by arbitrators’ decisions to avoid the punitive consequences from 
the courts’ contempt power.55  
As a result, the Locke Act lent significant impetus to statutory arbitration. 
For example, the number of cases conducted under the Locke Act increased tenfold 
between 1715 and 1785.56 Matthew Bacon observed that submission of arbitration 
agreements as a rule of court became frequent after the 1698 Act,57 while, some 
decades later, Blackstone stated that ‘experience […] has shown the great use of 
arbitration’ which was ‘in consequence’ of the 1698 Act.58 
Despite the remarkable success of the Locke Act, a large number of 
arbitration agreements, namely agreements under the common law, were not 
protected against revocation. This was corrected later in the 19th century when the 
Common Law Procedure Act 1854 was enacted to extend the treatment of the breach 
                                                        
52 Oldham (n 11) 42. 
53 Conklin (n 7) 63. 
54 Conklin (n 7) 63. 
55 Horwitz and Oldham (n 9) 155. 
56 Horwitz and Oldham (n 9) 147. 
57 Matthew Bacon, The Compleat Arbitrator (London, 1731) 33–34, as cited in Horwitz and 
Oldham (n 9) 145. 
58 Blackstone, Commentaries, (n 13). 
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of an arbitration agreement as a contempt of court to all arbitration agreements, 
regardless of whether the parties had agreed to register their agreement with the 
court.59 This was a significant development that brought the majority of arbitration 
agreements into the protective scope of statutory arbitration. Importantly also, the 
1854 Act set out, for the first time, statutory powers for the courts to refuse to hear a 
claim, which fell under an arbitration agreement, and refer the parties to arbitration.60  
By the end of the 19th century, English arbitration law had made another 
significant advancement, with the enactment of the Arbitration Act 1889.61 Crucially, 
the 1889 Act enshrined the rule of irrevocability for arbitration agreements and 
offered statutory protection to arbitration agreements for both existing and future 
disputes.62 Further, the Act expressly provided that arbitration awards even from 
arbitrations that were not made a rule of court would be ‘enforced in the same manner 
as a judgment or order to the same effect’.63  
The Arbitration Act 1889 had an immediate impact on judicial attitudes 
towards arbitration. For example, in 1913 in Bristol Corporation v John Aird,64 Lord 
Moulton observed that when English courts examine whether to enforce an 
arbitration agreement, they ‘should start with an earnest desire to keep the parties to 
the domestic tribunal which was contemplated both in the contract and throughout 
the execution of the works’, and noted that ‘the Court must always remember that the 
parties themselves are estopped from saying that the tribunal in its constitution is 
unfair, because it is the one which they accepted as the basis of the contract’.65 
                                                        
59 Common Law Procedure Act1854, s.XVII.  
60 Common Law Procedure Act 1854, s.XI. 
61 Born (n 2) 37. 
62 Arbitration Act 1889, s.1 and s.27. 
63 See for example, Arbitration Act 1889 s.2. 
64 Bristol Corporation v John Aird [1913] A.C. 241. 
65 Bristol Corporation v John Aird [1913] A.C. 241, 258. 
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Similarly, in the 1923 case of Ayscough v Sheed Thomson,66 Scrutton LJ 
observed that if commercial parties have agreed to arbitration ‘they should stand by 
their decision, and not try to upset it in the Courts’.67 In the same year in Kursell v 
Timber Operators,68 Salter J noted that ‘in modern times Parliament has shown a 
constantly increasing desire to aid and encourage private arbitration’, while three 
years later Scrutton LJ again observed in Metropolitan Tunnel v London Electric 
Railway that when parties have entered into an arbitration agreement ‘it is eminently 
desirable’ that they ‘should keep it’.69 
English statutory law in the 20th century continued to provide commercial 
parties and arbitrators with more powers in the conduct of arbitration proceedings. 
For example, the Arbitration Act 1950 accorded arbitrators the power to grant interim 
relief,70 while the Arbitration Act 1979 accorded parties the significant power to take 
their arbitration disputes out of the purview of judicial review for errors of law.71 
Importantly, the Act abolished the power of the courts, which they had since the 1854 
Act, to order arbitrators to refer (‘state’) a question of English law arising in the course 
of an arbitration or an award in the form of a special case for the decision of the High 
Court.72 
The enhancement of the policy favouring arbitration marked by the 
Arbitration Act 1979 was soon taken up by the judiciary,73 with Leggatt J observing in 
                                                        
66 Ayscough v Sheed Thomson [1923] (28 Com. Cas. 203). 
67  Ayscough v Sheed Thomson [1923] (28 Com. Cas. 203), [208]. 
68 Kursell v Timber Operators Ltd [1923] 2 K.B. 202. 
69  Metropolitan Tunnel v London Electric Railway [1926] Ch. 371, [388]. 
70 Arbitration Act 1950, s.14. 
71 See Lord Hacking’s entertaining account of the arbitration reforms implemented by the 
Arbitration Act 1979 in Lord Hacking, ‘The Story of the Arbitration Act 1979’ (2010) 76 
Arbitration 125, 128. 
72 See for example, Arbitration Act 1950, s.21. 
73 Hacking (n 71) 125. 
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Arab African Energy v Olie Produkten,74 that the ‘public policy’ in the relationship 
between English courts and arbitration was now underpinned by ‘the need for finality’ 
while ‘the striving for legal accuracy may be said to have been overtaken by 
commercial expediency’. Remarkably, the House of Lords in the seminal case The 
Nema75 exercised its power to not interfere with an arbitration out of ‘a Parliament 
intention’ that arbitration should not be controlled by English courts.76 Specifically, 
while an appeal against an award was expressly permitted by the Arbitration Act 
1979, the House of Lords held that in deciding whether to grant leave, the courts 
should take account of the parliamentary intention behind the Arbitration Act 1979 ‘to 
the turn of the tide in favour of finality in arbitral awards’, rather than the wording of 
the Act.77 
Finally, the Arbitration Act 1996 made it even harder for a party to 
challenge an arbitration award before English courts, under the strict test that a 
‘serious irregularity’ has occurred in an arbitration, which has caused or will cause 
‘substantial injustice’.78 Moreover, under the Arbitration Act 1996, parties have been 
accorded greater freedom to conduct their arbitration, and agree on the rules of 
evidence that should apply and the procedure that should be followed.79 Meanwhile, 
the courts, as is expressly provided in the Arbitration Act 1996, have to refrain from 
intervening in an arbitration in England, except as is provided in the Act itself.80  
                                                        
74 Arab African Energy v Olie Produkten [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 419. 
75 Pioneer Shipping Ltd v BTP Tioxide Ltd (The Nema) [1982] A.C. 724; [1981] 3 W.L.R. 292; 
[1981] 2 All E.R. 
76 Hacking (n 71) 125. 
76 Arab African Energy v Olie Produkten [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 419. 
77 Pioneer Shipping Ltd v BTP Tioxide Ltd (The Nema) [1982] A.C. 724, 739; [1981] 3 W.L.R. 292; 
[1981] 2 All E.R. 
78 Arbitration Act 1996, s.68. 
79 See for example, Arbitration Act 1996, ss.33–34. 
80 See Arbitration Act 1996, s.1.  
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The preceding analysis shows that in the last three centuries Parliament 
uninterruptedly enacted legislation that gave effect to a clear policy favouring 
arbitration as a means of promoting business, and that English courts deciding under 
statutory law were mainly keen to implement the pro-arbitration policy and give 
effect to arbitration agreements. These observations challenge the popular view that 
the pro-arbitration policy of English law developed as recently as the second part of 
the 20th century and that English courts until then were collectively hostile to 
arbitration. The next section turns its focus on how a pro-arbitration policy evolved 





As discussed above, the Locke Act introduced, for the first time in England, a 
favourable statutory framework for the enforcement of arbitration agreements and 
awards. However, even after the introduction of the Locke Act most parties continued 
to submit their disputes to arbitration under the common law. While there is no data 
to show the number of submissions under the common law in the 18th century, as 
submissions were not registered with the courts and were thus mostly unrecorded, it 
is likely that submissions would have been the predominant form of arbitration at the 
time, as it was simpler and quicker for two businesspeople to agree to arbitrate than 
to register their agreement with the court or expressly provide that their agreement 
would be ‘made a Rule of any of His Majesties Courts of Record’ as the Locke Act 
required.  
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However, an arbitration agreement that was outside the protective scope 
of the Locke Act was revocable at will under the common law. Indeed, the legal 
principle that a private agreement ‘could not oust’ the jurisdiction of English courts 
was a common law rule throughout the 18th and 19th century.  
The principle of revocability was first established in Vynior’s Case, which 
was decided in 1609.81 The case involved an action brought to the Court of Common 
Pleas by Robert Vynior against William Wilde on the basis that the latter failed to pay a 
bond of £20 which secured an arbitrator’s decision on a dispute over ‘divers kinds of 
parish business’.82 Wilde claimed that he was not under the obligation to pay the bond, 
because he had withdrawn from the arbitration before the arbitrators rendered their 
decision. The Court in Vynior’s Case reasoned that: 
 
[A]lthough [...] the defendant was bound in a bond to [...] observe 
arbitrament, yet he might countermand it; for a man cannot by his act 
make such authority [...] not countermandable, which is by the law and of 
its own nature countermandable.83  
 
The Vynior’s Case ruling was reiterated and further developed by 
Wellington v McIntosh84 and Kill v Hollister,85 which served as the main authorities for 
the rule that arbitration agreements were freely revocable under the common law in 
the 18th and mid-19th centuries. Specifically, in the 1743 Wellington decision, the 
parties had included an arbitration clause in their co-partnership agreement. When 
                                                        
81 Vynior’s Case (1609) 77 ER 597; 8 Co Rep 80a; also reported as Vivion v Wilde (1609) 2 Bro & 
Gold 290. 
82 Todd (n 7) 16. 
83 Vynior’s Case (1609) 77 ER 597, [598]–[600]; 8 Coke Report 80a-81a. 
84 Wellington v Mackintosh (1743) 26 ER 741, (1743) 2 Atk. 569. 
85 Kill v Hollister (1746) 1 Wils. K.B. 129. 
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the plaintiff brought a bill in the court for discovery and relief against frauds, the 
defendant pleaded the arbitration agreement and that the matter between the parties 
should have first been submitted to arbitration. Hardwicke LC disallowed the plead on 
the basis that the plaintiff’s bill was for discovery and relief ‘against frauds, 
impositions, and concealments, for which the arbitrators could not examine the 
parties on oath’.86 
A few years later, in the case of Kill, the plaintiff brought a lawsuit 
contending that, although the parties had included an arbitration clause in their 
insurance policy, he was entitled to commence litigation, because there was no 
arbitration pending. The King’s Bench, in a decision whose reasoning was set out in 
just over two lines, upheld the plaintiff’s claim holding that if a reference to arbitration 
was pending or if arbitrators had decided the dispute, a lawsuit might have been 
barred. However, the court held, because no reference was made, the lawsuit was ‘well 
brought’ before the court as ‘the agreement of the parties cannot oust this Court’.    
In subsequent years, English courts continued to hold, notably in Mitchell 
v Harris (1793) and Street v Rigby (1802), that an agreement to refer a dispute to 
arbitration ‘has its binding force as an agreement only’. The courts further developed 
the Kill ruling, holding that the authority conferred by the parties on arbitrators is ‘in 
its nature revocable’ even after an arbitration has commenced, albeit before an award 
has been made.87 The position of the English courts allowed parties to revoke 
arbitration agreements by self-executing a deed of revocation and effecting notice to 
the other party and the arbitrators a few days only before the arbitrators were about 
to render their award. In King v Joseph, for example, the plaintiff validly, according to 
                                                        
86 Wellington v Mackintosh (1743) 26 ER 741, 2 Atk. 569, [570]. 
87 See for example, Mitchell v Harris (1793) 2 Ves. Jr. 129, 30 ER 557; Street v Rigby (1802) 6 Ves. 
Jr. 815, 31 ER 1323; Milne and Others, Assignees of Rhodes and Justamond, Bankrupts v Gratrix 
(1806) 7 East 608, 103 ER 236; and King v Joseph (1814) 5 Taunton 452, 128 ER 765.    
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the decision, executed a deed of revocation of his submission on 21 September 1813 
and gave notice of the revocation to the arbitrators and the defendant on 24 
September 1813, with the arbitrators issuing their award on 25 September 1813.88 
Gibbs J held that, while the penalty from the arbitration bond cannot be revoked, the 
authority of the arbitrators could validly be revoked any time prior to the issuance of 
the award. 
It was not until 1856 and the House of Lords decision in Scott v Avery that 
the attitude of English common law courts towards enforceability of arbitration 
agreements would change.89 In Scott, an insurance policy on a ship provided that if a 
dispute arose “relative to the settling of any loss, or to a claim for average, or any other 
matter relating to the insurance,” it would eventually be referred to arbitration and 
the decision of the arbitrators would be a condition precedent to the commencement 
of a lawsuit in court. When the plaintiff brought a lawsuit under the policy, the 
defendant pleaded, inter alia, that the dispute should have first been referred to 
arbitrators. While the Court of Exchequer gave judgement for the plaintiff, the 
judgement was eventually reversed by the House of Lords which held that the 
agreement of the parties that an arbitral award would be a condition precedence to a 
lawsuit was a valid condition, and the parties could not commence litigation before an 
arbitrator had issued a decision.   
The House of Lords ruling in Scott marked a distinct advance in English 
arbitration law, by shifting the focus of legal inquiry from the question of whether 
parties could oust the jurisdiction of English courts to the question of whether there 
was any other (typically exceptional) circumstance, such as illegality or fraud, that 
                                                        
88 King v Joseph (1814) 5 Taunton 452, 128 ER 765. Similarly, in Brown v Tanner, the Younger 
(1825) M’Cleland and Younge 464, 148 ER 495, where the plaintiff revoked his submission on 
26 April 1824, and the arbitrators issued their award on 5 May 1824. 
89 Scott v Avery (1856) 5 H.L. Cas. 811, 10 ER 1121. 
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would prevent English courts from giving effect to the parties’ agreement to arbitrate. 
As a result, the rule that arbitration agreements under the common law were 
revocable at will was effectively substituted by the emergence of a policy rule under 
common law that an agreement to arbitrate should in principle be given effect, barring 
exceptional circumstances.90 In 1879 in Collins v Locke,91 for example, the courts 
observed that ‘since the case of Scott v Avery […] the contention that such a clause is 
bad as an attempt to the Court of jurisdiction may be passed by. The questions to be 
considered in the case of such clauses are whether an arbitration or award is 
necessary before a complete cause of action arises.’92 
The same approach was adopted by English courts even when a claim was 
brought in equity. For example, in Watford and Rickmansworth Railway Company v 
London and North Western Railway Company (1869), Lord Romilly rejected the 
suggestion that parties could not by contract oust the court’s jurisdiction of equity, 
stating that ‘full effect must be given by a Court of Equity to any agreement for 
arbitration’ and that a Court of Equity may, if it thinks fit, enforce an arbitration 
agreement ‘by compulsory process’.93 
It is clear from the preceding analysis that English common law did not 
develop a policy favouring the enforcement of arbitration agreements until the second 
part of the 19th century, and certainly much later than statutory law. However, this 
observation does not entail that common law courts in early modern England and 
                                                        
90 Ripley v Great Northern Railway 3I L.T.R. (N.s.) 869 (Ch. 1875), per Jessel MR at 870. 
91 Collins v Locke (1879) 4 App. Cas. 674. 
92 Collins v Locke (1879) 4 App. Cas. 674, [689]. See also Spackman v Plumstead Board of Works 
(1885) 10 App. Cas. 229; Scott v The Corporation of Liverpool Ct of Chancery (1858) 1 Giffard 
216, 44 ER 1297; Viney v Bignold (1888) L.R. 20 Q.B.D. 172; Trainor v Phoenix Fire Assurance 
Co., 65 L.T.R. 825 (Ch. 1892); Jackson v Barry Ry (1893) 68 L.T.R. 472; Spurrier v La Cloche, 
[1902] A.C. 446 (Privy Council); Gaw v British Law Fire Ins. Co, [1908] I Ir.R. 245. 
93 Watford and Rickmansworth Railway Company v London and Northwestern Railway Company 
(1869) L.R. 8 Eq. 231, [239]; although see Cooke v Cooke (1867) L.R. 4 Eq. 77 (Sir W. Page 
Wood). 
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until the 20th century were collectively and as a matter of general approach 
antagonistic to arbitration as the prevailing narrative in literature suggests.94 Claims 
for judicial hostility to arbitration are exaggerated, if not inaccurate, for the following 
reasons. 
Arbitration at least until the 18th century was not conceived as an extra-
judicial mode that was alternative to English courts. In fact, arbitration was often 
operating as part of the English judicial system. As was discussed above, English 
courts or other judicial authorities, including the Chancellor and the Council were 
habitually referring a great number of disputes, both mercantile and non-mercantile to 
arbitration throughout the early modern England.95  The observation that English 
courts frequently made use of the commercial expertise of, and had confidence in, 
arbitrators underscores the fact that, in the eyes of the judiciary, arbitration was not 
perceived as an outsider or a potential competitor. Rather, arbitration traditionally 
was seen as an ancillary to the judiciary in England.96  
It was only during the 18th and, in particular, the 19th centuries that 
arbitration started to evolve from being part of, and ancillary to, the English judicial 
system to being a distinct and alternative mode of dispute resolution. As was 
explained above, the catalyst for arbitration’s development was the introduction of the 
Locke Act at the end of the 17th century and the expansion of the statutory protection 
to all arbitration agreements with the 1854 Common Law Procedure Act. 
Did arbitration’s transition to an autonomous system of dispute 
resolution affect the judicial attitude of English courts, possibly requiring them to view 
arbitration as a rival? It is unlikely that this was the case.  
                                                        
94 See sources cited in notes 2 and 4 above; cf also Anonymous, ‘The Growth of Arbitration’ 
(1929) 67 Law Journal 247, 251. 
95 Todd (n 7) 8. 
96 See Roebuck (n 36) 340. 
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In the first place, the transition was the result of a gradual evolution over 
the course of three centuries (18th, 19th and 20th) rather than an abrupt split from the 
judiciary. The Locke Act introduced no radical measure that would separate 
arbitration from litigation, and did not abolish the courts’ practice of referring cases to 
arbitration. While Mansfield, serving as a Chief Justice in the 18th century, had 
acquired a strong reputation as a skilled judge of complex commercial disputes, he 
was actively encouraging settlement of disputes by arbitration and was routinely 
referring cases to be decided by distinguished commercial lawyers of the time, such as 
James Burrow and Thomas Lowten.97 Horwitz and Oldham state that over 300 suits 
appear in his trial notes as having been referred to arbitration in lieu of a jury 
verdict.98 Overall, even after the introduction of the Locke Act, references from the 
courts, including the Common Pleas and particularly the King’s Bench, continued to 
increase substantially in the course of the 18th century, from 48 in 1697 to 260 in 
1805.99 It was only after the introduction of the 1854 Act that references to arbitration 
started to decrease, not least because the majority of arbitration agreements were 
protected by statutory law, and therefore commercial parties had no reason to bring a 
lawsuit with the aim of having their dispute referred to arbitration.  
In the second place, there are few examples of hostility in English courts 
to arbitration notwithstanding the common law rule of revocability of arbitration 
agreements. In this regard, the typical reliance on Lord Coke’s 1609 decision in 
Vynior’s Case100 is mostly overstated, if not misplaced.  
Relying on Lord Coke’s dictum that the authority of arbitrators ‘is by the 
law and of its own nature countermandable’, some commentators have argued that 
                                                        
97 Horwitz and Oldham (n 9) 148. 
98 Horwitz and Oldham (n 9) 148.  
99  Horwitz and Oldham (n 9) 148.  
100 Vynior’s Case (1609) 77 ER 597; 8 Co Rep 80a. 
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English judges have traditionally been jealous of arbitration as a competing dispute 
resolution system, which they have historically sought to control and curtail.101 
However, other commentators suggest that the proposition that Vynior’s Case 
demonstrates hostility towards arbitration is ‘hardly tenable’.102  
In the third place, much has been made of Lord Campbell’s readings of the 
decisions in Wellington and Kill which, according to Lord Campbell, suggested that 
English courts treated arbitration agreements as unwarranted attempts to oust the 
courts of their jurisdiction.103 Referring to Wellington and Kill, Lord Campbell noted in 
Scott v Avery that English judges ‘had great jealously of arbitration’ because ‘the 
emoluments of the Judges depended mainly, or almost entirely, on fees, and as they 
had no fixed salaries there was great competition to get as much as possible of 
litigation into Westminster Hall and there was a great scramble in Westminster Hall 
for the division of the spoil.’ 104  
However, Lord Campbell’s account of English judicial attitudes towards 
arbitration has been described by commentators as an overstatement105 or as unable 
to survive scrutiny.106 Importantly, it has been observed that Campbell’s readings of 
Wellington and Kill were based on defective printed reports, and that Hardwicke L.C. 
in Wellington had actually dismissed counsel’s claim that the arbitration agreements 
between the parties should be construed as ‘tending to oust the jurisdiction of the 
court’.107  
                                                        
101 See for example, Cohen (n 2) 95, 105, 128142; Zweigert and Kotz (n 2) 412; Holdsworth (n 2); 
Benson (n 2) 479–501, who talks about judicial hostility in the late 18th and early 19th centuries.  
102 Earl S. Wolaver, ‘The Historical Background of Commercial Arbitration’ (1934) 83(2) University 
of Pennsylvania Law Review 132, 139. 
103 Born (n 2) 37.  
104 Scott v Avery [1856] 5 H.L. Cas. 811, [853]. 
105 Born (n 2) 37. 
106 Roebuck (n 36). 
107 See Horwitz and Oldham (n 9), 146. 
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The preceding analysis suggests that while the principle of revocability of 
arbitration agreements remained part of the common law until the 19th century, the 
judicial attitude to arbitration was never fundamentally hostile. The following section 
offers a general appraisal of the historical treatment of arbitration in England and 
offers contrasting experiences from other jurisdictions, notably France, the US and 
Germany.    




If claims for judicial hostility are mistaken, the historical attitude of 
English courts towards arbitration can be more accurately described as one of 
cautious trust, which was informed by two main groups of competing considerations. 
On the one hand, the well-embedded respect that English courts and the common law 
had for party autonomy, especially after the 18th century,108 favoured arbitration. 
Valuing the idea that merchants should be presumed to know best how to organise 
their affairs, English courts have traditionally been keen to give effect to private 
dispute resolution arrangements by commercial parties. Lord Campbell must have 
echoed the views of many English judges when he stated in Russell v Pellegrini (1856) 
that109 ‘I never could imagine for what reason parties should not be permitted to bind 
themselves to settle their disputes in any manner on which they agreed.’110 Further, 
English courts’ typical pragmatism meant that they viewed arbitration as a potentially 
useful dispute resolution method that could alleviate the burden of their own heavy 
                                                        
108 Alex Mills, Party Autonomy in Private International Law (CUP 2018), Chapter 2.  
109 Russell v Pellegrini (1856) 6 Ellis & Blackburn 1020. 
110 Russell v Pellegrini (1856) 6 Ellis & Blackburn 1020 [1025]. 
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caseload. It is estimated, for example, that in early modern England an average of 
about 60,000 suits were brought every year before the central courts of King’s Bench, 
Common Pleas, Chancery, Exchequer and Requests.111 In addition, around 400,000 
suits were brought annually in urban courts, and another 500,000 in the small rural 
courts throughout the country.112 English courts in the 16th and 17th centuries, in 
particular, found it difficult to cope with the litigious culture of the time, and 
references to arbitration were seen as a helpful and welcome development.   
On the other hand, English courts would still espouse the idea that 
arbitration agreements could not oust their jurisdiction. As a result, the rule of 
revocability remained good law throughout the 18th and the 19th century, largely 
undermining the binding force of arbitration agreements under common law. As was 
noted above, some commentators have observed that the rulings in Wellington and 
Kill, which together with Vinyor’s Case were the foundations of the revocability rule, 
were largely misreported.113 However, late 18th and early 19th century judges were 
perfectly aware of the fact that reports on these cases were defective; yet, they 
continued to endorse the rule of revocability. For example, having reviewed 
Wellington, the Lord Chancellor in Mitchell v Harris114 observed that: 
 
There is no doubt that the reporter has mistaken Lord Hardwicke's 
reasons in the case. He has only taken down part of what was said and has 
                                                        
111 Muldrew (n 16) 915. 
112 Muldrew (n 16) 915. 
113 See Horwitz and Oldham (n 9), 146. 
114 Mitchell v Harris (1793) 2 Ves. Jr. 129. 
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misapplied that; but still the case stands as a clear authority that the plea 
was overruled.115 
 
If the late 18th and 19th century English courts were aware of the fact that 
the cases which served as the foundations of the revocability rule were defective, why 
did they continue to consider that arbitration agreements for future disputes were 
objectionable as ‘ousting the jurisdiction of the court’?116   
Some commentators play down the rule of revocability, suggesting that 
the Coke’s dictum in Vynior’s Case should be read in the historical context of the 17th 
century, when plaintiffs tended to submit to both arbitration tribunals and courts to 
commence the same proceedings against the same defendant, and they were 
subsequently revoking submissions when proceedings in one forum was developing 
against them.117 In this regard, Todd argues that Coke’s dictum most likely reflected 
the general practice and the law which at the time allowed plaintiffs to freely revoke 
submissions from a forum, rather than pronouncing a legal principle undermining the 
binding force of arbitration agreements.118 However, Todd’s suggestion does not 
reconcile with the clear ruling of numerous decisions in the 18th and 19th century 
which, as discussed, repeatedly upheld the rule that an arbitration agreement for 
future disputes was not binding as invalidly purporting to oust the jurisdiction of the 
courts of law. 
Indeed, the revocability rule was not even reversed by the House of Lords 
ruling in Scott v Avery in mid-19th century as arbitration scholars often wrongly 
                                                        
115 Mitchell v Harris (1793) 2 Ves. Jr. 129, [135]; Halfhide v Fenning (1788) 2 Bro. C. C. 336 
(Kenyon MR). 
116 I am grateful to the anonymous reviewer who raised this question in an earlier draft of this 
article.  
117
 Todd (n 17) 17. 
118 Todd (n 7) 17. 
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assume.119 In fact, the House of Lords in Scott unanimously confirmed that under 
common law a private contract could not oust the jurisdiction of English courts. 
However, the court held that the revocability rule only prevented parties from waiving 
by contract their right of court action in respect of a future breach of contract.120 By 
contrast, it was held, there was nothing in the common law to prevent parties from 
agreeing that no breach of contract would occur until the parties had first referred 
their dispute to arbitration, and an arbitration tribunal had issued its decision.121 
Parties could not freely revoke an agreement that an arbitration award was a 
condition precedent to the breach of contract, because such an agreement did not 
purport to generally oust the jurisdiction of English courts, which would not arise until 
a breach of contract had first occurred.  
If defective reporting or the general practice allowing plaintiffs to bring 
the same claim before both courts and arbitration tribunals cannot explain the 
persisting appeal of the revocability rule in the 18th and the 19th century, it is 
suggested that this can be explained if due regard is given to the way English courts 
understood arbitration at the time. As is suggested in this article, for English courts 
arbitration was seen as a dispute resolution mode which was ancillary to, rather than 
substitute of, the courts of law or equity.122  Therefore, for English courts an arbitration 
agreement for future disputes could never be valid as an agreement to substitute 
English courts by conferring judicial powers to a panel of arbitrators; rather, it could 
only be valid as an agreement to confer powers to arbitrators as agents for the two 
disputing parties to determine their liabilities to each other by award before the 
                                                        
119 See for example, Born (n 2) 36–37. 
120 Scott v Avery (1856) 5 H.L. Cas. 811, 10 ER 1121, [847] (Lord Chancellor). 
121 Scott v Avery (1856) 5 H.L. Cas. 811, 10 ER 1121, [847]–[848] (Lord Chancellor) and [852] 
(Lord Campbell). 
122 Cf Mr Justice Cresswell, in Scott v Avery, (1856) 5 H.L. Cas. 811, 10 ER 1121, [840]. 
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jurisdiction of the English  courts arises.123 However, like an agency agreement, an 
arbitration agreement was freely revocable upon notice. Indeed, several English 
decisions in the 19th century reflect the understanding of English courts that the 
arbitrators’ function was essentially akin to that of an agent, and their powers were 
fiduciary, not judicial. For example, in Cooper v Johnson,124 it was held that when a 
party to an arbitration dies after the hearing but before the award was made, the 
arbitrators have no authority to issue an award. The court reasoned that ‘the death of 
either part is a revocation of the arbitrator’s authority’. In West London Extension v 
Fulham Union,125 it was held that the arbitrators have no power to award costs, unless 
they are expressly authorised by terms of reference. In Hunter v Rice,126 it was held 
that the award of arbitrators in itself did not operate to change or establish title to 
property which the arbitrator had found that it had to be delivered by a tenant to his 
landlord upon a certain amount of money. Lord Ellenborough, C.J held that the award 
required the tenant’s “ratification” and “assent”, noting ‘if indeed [the tenant] had 
accepted the money tendered, that would have been a ratification of the award, and an 
assent on his part to the transfer of the property; but without that, I cannot conceive 
that the property was transferred by the mere force of the award.’ 
It is because English courts understood arbitration agreements as agency 
contracts whereby arbitrators were accorded fiduciary, not judicial, powers, the above 
cases found that the arbitrator’s authority was revoked with the death of a party, the 
arbitrators had no discretionary power to award costs and the award in itself could 
not operate to change or establish title to property.127 
                                                        
123 I am grateful to the anonymous reviewer for this comment. 
124 (1819) 2 B. & Ald. 394, 106 ER. 
125(1870) L. R. 5 Q. B. 361.  
126 (1812) 15 East 100, 104 E.R. 782. 
127 T. Nathan, ‘Two Views of Commercial Arbitration’, Harvard Law Review 
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While jurisdictional theories treating arbitration as an essentially 
adjudicative process that substitutes the judicial function of national courts were 
developed in the early 20th century,128 arbitration agreements in that period were 
seen from an exclusively contractual point of view, being unable to produce any 
jurisdictional effect. Naturally thus English courts of the time considered that the 
revocation of an arbitration agreement was not a valid bar to a lawsuit under the 
common law or equity.129 The aggrieved party could only sue for damages for a breach 
of an arbitration agreement.130 
Thus, the main objection of the English courts to the binding force of 
arbitration agreements was essentially doctrinal; it was not ideological or a matter of 
policy of the law. Once the House of Lords ruling in Scot offered a doctrinal way out of 
this objection, and arbitration agreements for future disputes were treated as a valid 
condition precedent to the jurisdiction of English courts, rather than as agreements 
purporting to oust their jurisdiction, English courts had no difficulty to adopt a policy 
favouring their enforcement.  Lord Campbell characteristically noted: 
[W]hat pretence can there be for saying that there is anything contrary to public 
policy in allowing parties to contract, that they shall not be liable to any action 
until their liability has been ascertained by a domestic and private tribunal, upon 
which they themselves agree? Can the public be injured by it? It seems to me that 
it would be a most inexpedient encroachment upon the liberty of the subject if he 
were not allowed to enter into such a contract […] I can see not the slightest ill 
consequence that can flow from such an agreement, and I see great advantage 
that may arise from it. Public policy, therefore, seems to me to require that effect 
should be given to the contract.131 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
(1927), 40, 939.  
128 Mainly in the European continent, see for example, Balladore-Pallieri, ‘L’arbitrage privé dans 
les rapports internationaux’ Recueil des Cours (1935) 187, 51. For England see FA Mann, ‘State 
Contracts and International Arbitration’, Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. (1967) 42, 10-11.  
129 See Brown v Tanner, the Younger (1825) M’Cleland and Younge 464, 148 ER 495. 
130 Mitchell v Harris (1793) 2 Ves. Jr. 129. 
131 Scott v Avery (1856) 5 H.L. Cas. 811, 10 ER 1121, [853]. 
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The judicial and legislative treatment of arbitration in England should be 
contrasted, for example, with the position of the judiciary and legislature in France, 
the US or in Germany, where attitudes in certain times in the 18th, 19th and 20th 
century reflected a fundamental, often ideological, opposition to arbitration which was 
largely seen as a private, and therefore suspicious, mode of dispute resolution lacking 
the necessary safeguards for the protection of the public interest. While the use of 
arbitration was widespread in the 16th and 17th century in France, after the French 
Revolution in 1789, arbitration was considered a threat to the rule of law and the 
authority of the revolutionary state,132 with the 1806 Napoleonic Code of Civil 
Procedure imposing a number of important procedural restrictions on arbitration 
agreements and the arbitration process.133 As one commentator has noted, ‘all the 
provisions of the [Napoleonic Code] do appear to reflect a hatred of arbitration 
agreements and provide evidence of a secret desire to eliminate their existence’.134 
Importantly, hostility towards the idea of arbitration, which was treated as inferior, 
rather than an alternative, to national courts was largely shared by the French courts 
of the time.135 The Cour de cassation, for example, in the 1843 decision in Cie L’Alliance 
v Prunier refused to give effect to an arbitration agreement, stating that ‘[o]ne does not 
find with an arbitrator the same qualities that it is assured to find with a magistrate: 
                                                        
132 Born (n 2) 39; E.J. Cohn, ‘Commercial Arbitration and the Rules of Law: A Comparative Study’ 
(1941) 4 University of Toronto Law Journal 1, 1–32. 
133 See in particular Articles (1003) to (1028) of the Code of Civil Procedure (1806), which 
introduced an extremely unfavorable legal regime for arbitration. See further Born (n 2) 40; 
and Rene David, Arbitration in International Trade (Kluwer Law International 1985) 90. 
134  David (n 135Error!	 Reference	 source	 not	 found.Error!	 Reference	 source	 not	
found.Error!	 Reference	 source	 not	 found.Error!	 Reference	 source	 not	 found.Error!	
Reference	 source	not	 found.Error!	Reference	source	not	 found.Error!	Reference	source	
not	found.) 90, quoting Bellot. 
135 J.-J. Clère, ‘L’arbitrage révolutionnaire: apogée et déclin d’une institution (1790-1806)’ (1981) 
Rev. Arb. 3. 
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the probity, the impartiality, the skillfulness, [and] the sensitivity of feelings necessary 
to render a decision’.136 
A similar opposition to the main idea of arbitration was exhibited by the 
US courts and the legislator during the 18th and 19th centuries. Born has observed that 
‘significant judicial (and legislative) hostility to arbitration agreements’ existed in the 
US,137 which reflected a widespread perception that arbitration lacked important 
procedural safeguards and arbitrators were often unsuitable to ascertain and apply 
the law. The mistrust of arbitration and arbitrators was characteristically summarised 
by Joseph Story in the following terms:   
 
Now we all know that arbitrators at common law […] are not ordinarily 
well enough acquainted with the principles of law or equity to administer 
either effectually in complicated cases; and hence […] the judgment of 
arbitrators is but rusticum judicium. Ought then a court of equity to 
compel a resort to such a tribunal, by which, however honest and 
intelligent, it can in no case be clear that the real legal or equitable rights 
of the parties can be fully ascertained or perfectly protected?138 […] At all 
events courts of justice are presumed to be better capable of 
administering and enforcing the rights of the parties than any mere 
private arbitrators, as well from their superior knowledge as from their 
superior means of sifting the controversy to the very bottom.139 
 
                                                        
136 Judgment of 10 July 1843, Compagnie L’Alliance v Prunier, 1843 Dalloz 561, (French Cour de 
cassation civ.), reprinted in (1992) Rev. arb. 399. 
137 Born (n 2) 45. 
138 Tobey v County of Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313, 1321–1322 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845). 
139 Joseph Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence: As Administered in England and America 
(Volume 1) (13th edn, 1886), § 670. 
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Because of this ideological opposition to arbitration, arbitration 
agreements for future disputes were considered in the 19th and at the beginning of the 
20th century as against US public policy,140 and arbitrators’ decisions were overturned 
by the US courts for procedural matters that were often minor and inconsequential.141  
While legislative developments in the 20th century, notably the enactment 
of state legislation on arbitration142 as well as the Federal Arbitration Act 1925, 
introduced a legal framework for the protection of arbitration agreements, a general 
mistrust of the propriety of arbitration pervaded the attitude of the US courts, 
including the US Supreme Court,143 until as late as the second part of the 20th century. 
For example, the US Second Circuit in American Safety Equipment Corp v J.P. Maguire & 
Co (1968)144 noted that as  
 
Issues of war and peace are too important to be vested in the generals [...] 
decisions as to antitrust regulation of business are too important to be 
lodged in arbitrators chosen from the business community – particularly 
those from a foreign community that has had no experience with or 
exposure to our law and values.  
 
                                                        
140 Joseph Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence as Administered in England and America, 
(Volume 2) (13th edn, 1886), §1457; Parsons v Ambos, 48 S.E. 696, 697 (Ga. 1904) holding that 
‘by first making the contract and then declaring who should construe it [NB: arbitrators], the 
strong could oppress the weak, and in effect so nullify the law as to secure the enforcement of 
contracts usurious, immoral or contrary to public policy’. 
141 See Benson (n 2) 484; and the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Williams v 
Paschall, 4 U.S. 284 (1803); and Maybin v Coulon, 4 U.S. 298 (1804).  
142 See for example New York legislation of 1920. 
143  See for example US Supreme Court decisions in Bernhardt v Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 
203, 76 S Ct 273, 276, 100 L.Ed. 199 (1956); Wilko v Swan, 346 U.S., at 435–437, 74 S Ct, at 186–
188 (1953) and Alexander v Gardner-Denver 415 U.S. 36, 94 S Ct 1011, 39 L.Ed.2d 147 (1974). 
144 391 F. 2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968). 
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Similarly, while historically commercial arbitration was commonly used 
by merchants in what is today Germany, German courts and commentary developed 
an acute mistrust for arbitration after the rise of the National Socialists in 1930s, 
systematically curtailing the use of arbitration as a matter of policy.145  Cohn, writing 
in the 1940s, observed that ‘to the totalitarian state, with its doctrine of the all-
enslaving power of the state arbitration means an attempt of private individuals to 
free an important part of their activities from the dominating yoke of the governing 
group’.146 Accordingly, no municipal authority was allowed to submit to arbitration 
while the policy of the exchange control authorities to whom every international 
arbitration agreement was submitted for approval before it became binding on a 
German party tended to eliminate arbitration as far as feasible.147   
To a large extent, hostile attitudes to arbitration in these jurisdictions can 
be explained by exceptional historical and constitutional circumstances, particularly in 
early 19th century in France and in early 20th century in Germany, which had a 
profound effect on the role of the state and its relationship with private initiatives, 
including private modes of dispute resolution. By contrast, parliamentary sovereignty 
in England was largely established in the 18th century and, possibly as a result, English 
courts had fewer reasons to perceive arbitration as a challenge to the authority of the 
state law and courts. Indeed, the largely doctrinal objection of the English courts 
against arbitration agreements was very different than the broad concern that 
arbitration, as a private mode of dispute resolution, is inherently unfit and, thus, a 
potential threat to the public interest as suggested by the French, American and 
German experience. Traditionally, under English law very few restrictions of 
                                                        
145 Born (n 2) 51.  
146 E. J. Cohn, ‘Commercial Arbitration and the Rules of Law: a Comparative Study’ U. Toronto L.J. 
(1941) 4(1), 28.   
147 Ibid.  
Page 37 of 41 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies
 38
arbitration existed on grounds of public interest or public policy. While English courts 
have held that ‘what is a matter of public interest […] cannot be determined within the 
limitations of a private contractual process,’148 what is considered a matter of public 
interest in the context of arbitration is narrow in scope.149 None of the arbitration acts, 
from the Locke Act until the current 1996 Act, referenced in any form or guise the 
concept of public interest as a possible ground for prohibiting arbitration or 
challenging an award.150 Traditionally, the concept of public policy, which was 
enshrined in some arbitration acts as a ground to refuse enforcement of an arbitration 
award, was narrowly construed and mainly limited to circumstances of illegality in the 
arbitration proceedings.151 As was demonstrated above, the House of Lords from the 
mid-19th century in Scott v Avery stated that there was nothing contrary to English 
public policy in allowing parties to agree that a claim would not be submitted to 





Challenging the prevailing narrative about the traditional hostility of 
English courts and law to arbitration is important not only to correct the reductive 
historical account of how English arbitration developed in the last four centuries, but 
also to provide helpful insights into current debates surrounding the legitimacy of 
arbitration and potential reform of English arbitration law.   
                                                        
148 Fulham Football Club (1987) Ltd v Richards [2011] EWCA Civ 855 [40]. 
149 Fulham Football Club (1987) Ltd v Richards [2011] EWCA Civ 855 [98]–[99]. 
150 Stavros Brekoulakis and Margaret Devaney, ‘Public-Private Arbitration and the Public Interest 
under English Law’ (2017) 80(1) Modern Law Review 22–56. 
151 Westacre Investments Inc v Jugoimport-SDPR Holding Co Ltd [1999] EWCA Civ 1401; 
Soleimany v Soleimany [1998] 3 W.L.R. 811. 
152 Scott v Avery [1856] 5 H.L. Cas. 811 [853]. 
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A wide range of scholars currently criticise arbitration as part of the 
project of neoliberalism to serve private interests and in particular the interests of 
powerful corporations.153 For these commentators, arbitration entails the ‘reassertion 
of merchant’ authority and ultimately the substitution of state institutions, including 
the judiciary and law, by private forms of adjudication. It is thus argued that the legal 
policy favouring arbitration, which entails that arbitral awards are not generally 
reviewable by national courts on a question of law, should be curtailed, or altogether 
abolished, because it is ‘part of a corporate strategy to further disembed commercial 
law and practice from the public sphere’ and to enable private parties to operate in the 
shadow of the law.154 
The main historical idea behind these views is that the policy favouring 
arbitration is a recent development of the late 20th century, coinciding with, and 
assisted by, the emergence of neoliberal accounts of commercial and corporate law. 
This idea is premised on the binary assumption that arbitration, as a form of private 
justice, can only thrive when the state system of civil justice is weak. It is claimed, for 
example, that arbitration in England first came to flourish in the 15th century when, 
and because, state law and the judiciary were dysfunctional.155 However, it is argued, 
as the state and its legal institutions, including the common law in England, became 
more able and effective during the 17th and 18th centuries, the authority of arbitration 
was curtailed.156 According to this account thus, it is only recently, when the rise of 
capitalism and the re-emergence of transnational merchant law theories challenged 
the authority of states to regulate their affairs at the end of the 20th century, that a 
                                                        
153 See for example Amy Cohen, ‘Dispute Systems Design, Neoliberalism, and The Problem of 
Scale’, (2009) 14 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 51, 55 and Claire Cutler, Private Power and Global Authority: 
Transnational Merchant Law in the Global Political Economy (CUP 2003). 
154 Cutler (n 155) 183. 
155 See the sources cited in n 5. 
156 Ibid. 
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policy favouring arbitration was developed to further erode the power of the state 
judiciary to control private interests.157  
While some of these accusations give rise to valid concerns, especially for 
investment arbitration and public-private arbitration, i.e. arbitrations which implicate 
the public interest and which are, indeed, a development of the last century,158 they 
are largely premised on wrong assumptions in relation to commercial arbitration. 
Indeed, linking arbitration with weak state legal institutions and the rise of capitalism 
in the 20th century is historically questionable, at least in England. The preference for 
arbitration was not the result of a sudden change in the policy of English law and 
courts that occurred at the beginning of the 20th century. As this article has 
demonstrated, a clear policy favouring arbitration has been embedded in statutory 
law from as early as the end of the 17th century, and was subsequently adopted by the 
common law in the 19th century. Importantly, the pro-arbitration policy in English law 
was not driven by the ideological forces of capitalism aiming to erode the powers and 
interests of the State. As has been explained, the policy favouring arbitration was 
implemented in the 17th century to accord statutory protection to a practice which 
was widely shared by traders and merchants for its distinct advantages over litigation. 
Further, arbitration is not necessarily a historical symptom of weakened 
state authority and state institutions. Arbitration in England developed in parallel with 
the common law in the 18th and the 19th centuries. Crucially, arbitration did not 
historically emerge to challenge the state courts. As this article has shown, arbitration 
in England emerged as part of the courts system and was largely viewed as a trusted 
supplement, and ancillary, to the judicial machinery.  
                                                        
157 Philip J. McConnaughay, ‘The Risks and Virtues of Lawlessness: A “Second Look” at 
International Commercial Arbitration’ (1999) 93 Nw. U. L. Rev. 453, 453. 
158 Brekoulakis and Devaney (n 152). 
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Given that the Law Commission in the UK has recently identified 
arbitration as one area which may require reform as part of the Commission’s 13th 
programme of law reform,159 it is important for the legal community to embark on a 
balanced debate about arbitration and English arbitration law, rather basing views on 
inaccurate or partisan assumptions concerning the historical role of arbitration in 
England. English arbitration law can and should be amended to protect the public 
interest in certain types of arbitrations more effectively, notably public-private 
arbitrations, as the author has discussed in detail elsewhere.160 However, calls for an 
indiscriminate abolition of the policy favouring arbitration represent a split from a 
long tradition in English law and are premised on a crude and historically 
unsupported account of arbitration as a method of private justice which opposes state 




                                                        
159 https://www.lawcom.gov.uk/arbitration/ [Accessed 9 July 2018]. 
160 Brekoulakis and Devaney (n 152). 
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